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PearWammer is always focused and rarely i out of line during play. Rizen has more gears to his game than most. He is very focused on his image and his opponents' style of play, and then picks a style or strategy which is best for a specific situation, in that particular moment, against 4 particular opponent.
Rizen plays a conservative sit-back approach at times, but he is willing to mix it up with you and take it to another level when game conditions demand it, Rizen takes risks, but generally only does so in low-risk, high-reward situations. This book is the first volume in a two volume set. Volume covers hands up until the money bubble. Volume II, will look at. Rizen and PearlJammer discuss 50 hands they have selected from their own play. Apestyles discusses One of the goals of the book was to try to select players with different styles so that you, the reader, may observe contrasting styles in similar poker situations, To further illustrate these contrasts, I also selected 20 of my own hands, and asked all three authors to comment on how they would play the hand, Some of the hands were chosen to demonstrate consensus on important concepts, while other hands were chosen in the.
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Rating details. Sort order. Apr 02, Tmone75 Harris rated it it was amazing. I just finished this book. What I love about this book is that you can get into the minds of the greatest online poker players playing in the biggest online games. Bubble play, Big Stack play, Small Stack play.. Each page is a different situation. Reading this book will make you better online overnight.
Lots of food for thought for advanced players but not over the top in technical jargon on the whole. Looking forward to reading volume two! Everything was fine and I received my order a week earlier. These industry leading experts give a very valuable insight in to thier games. I cant wait for the follow up. This is trully gold. See all reviews. Your recently viewed items and featured recommendations. Back to top. Get to Know Us. Make Money with Us. Amazon Payment Methods. Nonetheless, calling to take the flop out-of-position against an opponent who should be very strong is not an option.
I could move all-in, using the bubble and my stack to put my opponent to the test; however, this appears to be a mistake for several reasons. Since he open raised with such a small stack, I should not have any fold equity if he is even halfway competent.
My hand clearly should not fare well against his range. Lastly, I am the chip leader, and he raised into my big blind, which should indicate even more strength than a raise from any other position. All in all, this becomes a clear fold. I fold, and Seat 9 wins the pot.
Setup: This hand immediately follows the previous one. Preflop 9, : The action folds around to Seat 5, who opens to 9, on the button. I have a marginally strong broadway hand on the small blind. Note that if Seat 5 had less than 20 big blinds, I would fold without much thought, since I would usually assume that he would not be opening from the button with that stack unless he was willing to go all the way.
However, he has 26 big blinds, making this a spot in which its worth considering a resteal. Flat-calling is out of the question, as I do not want to play this hand postflop out of position or give the strong player in the big blind the chance to squeeze. Folding is reasonable, since I should be somewhat leery of his willingness to raise from the button with this size stack on the bubble when he should know that both players in the blinds are likely to play back at him.
Threebetting to about 27K with the intention of folding to a fourbet shove is another option. Normally, if I were to threebet this button raise from the small blind, I would make it about 32 to 35K, a little larger than my in-position threebet size because I would not want my opponent to decide to take the flop with position. However, that size would commit me to call a fourbet shove, and I do not want to commit myself with this hand!
Because we are on a bubble, I feel that a smaller reraise accomplishes the same goal since my opponent is very unlikely to call at this stage. He should be much more inclined to either fourbet shove or fold.
In retrospect, because of the bubble and my stack, I believe I probably should have threebet to 27K. However, at the time, I convinced myself that he should be willing to play for his stack and likely fourbet shove, so I chose to fold. The big blind also folded, and Seat 5 won the pot.
The blinds have increased to 2, 5, with a ante, putting added pressure on the short stacks. The increase also makes every steal slightly more valuable. Preflop 11, : The action folds to me on the button with a reasonable hand but certainly not one with which I would want any action. However, with my big stack and the final table looming, I want to take every shot at the blinds that I can. If I raise to my standard of 12,, I would have to fold to a shove from Seat 8.
If Seat 9 were to shove, my decision would be very close. The pot would be laying me about 1. However, since he is an unknown player, and we are on a relatively large final table bubble, I expect him to play tight and probably fold hands as strong as K-T, Q-J or A-7 which stronger players, unconcerned with the bubble would shove.
From an EV perspective, the decision is very close. With such a large stack, it is in my best interest to keep the bubble alive as long as possible since the added pressure allows me to abuse the situation and keep adding to my stack with very little risk. Note that I would normally not raise the button facing these stacks in the blinds, knowing that I will not call a reshove from either player. However, my increased fold equity given the bubble situation invites me to raise virtually any two cards in this spot.
I raise to 12,, and both blinds fold. Preflop 11, : Seat 4 folds, and Seat 5 opens for 11, Since I have been very aggressive lately, and my opponents likely know that I am abusing the bubble, A-Q appears even stronger than usual. I am certainly willing to play for any of my opponents stacks behind me. Seat 5 is the only player with enough chips to give me a moment to consider the situation. Because he has more than twenty big blinds, he should be able to raise and fold.
However, the reshove stacks behind him and me with position on him should cause him to fold many hands he might otherwise raise. In his shoes, with his stack, I would be very hesitant to open raise any hand with which I would not be willing to call off my entire stack. Nevertheless, he is an unknown to me, and I do not expect him to think on this level. I also know that even if he is as strong as A-Q or JJ, he may be unwilling to call off his entire stack on the final table bubble.
Therefore, with a hand as strong as A-Q, I must put pressure on him by reraising. Instead of a standard threebet to about 29K here, I prefer to shove allin; this may get him to fold some hands like A-Q or JJ 88 with which he may fourbet shove if I were to threebet small.
Note that if he were a strong, well-known, highstakes player, I would not expect him to fold hands as strong as JJ or TT, or perhaps even smaller pairs to my shove. However, I have much greater fold equity in this spot against an unknown player. I shove all-in, and all my opponents fold. Setup: This is three hands following the previous hand. I decided not to steal with o and K-5s in early position, although I certainly could have attempted steals at this juncture with either.
I have just been moved to the other table, as they lost a player and the tables had to be balanced. We are now down to ten players, on the absolute bubble of the final table. I am extremely familiar with Seats 2 and 4 at my new table, both very strong, highly skilled tournament players. My experience tells me Seat 2 is on the loose-aggressive side while Seat 4 is on the tight-aggressive side, but both players are very capable of mixing it up and adjusting to their opponents.
I am not at all familiar with Seats 1 or 8. I have the overall chip lead, but I am no longer in a dominant position as I was on the other table. However, I am fortunate to have been moved to the left of both strong players. Preflop 10, : The action folds around to Seat 2, who opens for 12, on the button. Seat 4 folds, and the action is on me with a strong, suited onegapper. Because we are on the final table bubble, restealing with this hand would be perfectly reasonable.
If I made the play, I would threebet to approximately 38K and fold to a fourbet shove. However, I am hesitant to make this move in my first hand at a new table. My opponent is loose-aggressive, and certainly not afraid to risk his stack on the final table bubble to pick up a healthy pot. He should also be well aware when he raises the button into the two chip leaders that either of us may play back at him. Since I expect him to be thinking ahead, he may already be prepared to fourbet shove a threebet from either of us.
On the other hand, because he understands that both of us in the blinds are tight-aggressive players and also aware of the same factors, he may be thinking on that next level and feel confident in stealing! This sort of back and forth and next-level thinking can lead to some very tricky situations like this one. I decide that it is probably not worth risking a threebet, but my hand is too strong to fold given our stacks. I call 7, and take the flop heads up out of position.
Flop 31, : I whiff the flop and check to my opponent as I would do on virtually any flop. Turn 31, : My opponent showed weakness on the flop, tempting me to lead out on many turn cards here. Unfortunately the Q on the turn makes it very hard for me to represent a hand. I would expect my opponent to call a bet here with as little as ace high or perhaps even weaker hands. Against a weak opponent, on this bubble, I would lead out most of the time; however against this player, I believe a lead to be hopeless.
I doubt he has air, as he would probably have continuation-bet the flop if he whiffed with a hand like 87s. Even if he chose to check air on the flop, he may either float or raise if I bet the turn. I would fold to a raise, although there is a case for threebet shoving, as he is unlikely to raise on the turn with any hand that could call a shove.
If he called, I would certainly have to give up on any non J or 9 on the river, and I may end up paying off a big value bet if I hit and he has me beat. Lastly, there is a case for leading out here and leading again for about half the pot on the river if he calls. However, that line looks like a bluff to many thinking opponents.
I would be relying on my image to make such a play, but the final table bubble is usually not the best time to rely on my image, as Im likely to be read as doing so. I check, and my opponent bets 14, I do have two more options to try to win the pot. I could checkraise and bluff the river if called, but this line often looks like a bluffjust like leading the turn and riverto a thinking opponent.
The last option is floating out of position and leading out on the river. This may be the least obvious as a bluff, but he is likely to pick this off with a hand with any showdown value, since he would expect me to checkraise or lead the turn with a Q.
The turn card pairing the queen makes this pot extremely difficult to pick up against a looseaggressive opponent, especially on the bubble. I exhaust my options and fold. Setup: This is two hands after the previous hand. I folded o from the small blind to another raise from Seat 2. We are still playing hand-forhand with ten players remaining.
Preflop 10, : The action folds to me on the button with a relatively strong hand given my position and the bubble. If either Seat 2 or Seat 4 had raised, it would have been a very good threebetting spot in position. Yet the action folded to me, and I have the two unknowns in the blinds behind me. If they each had at least about 13 big blinds or more, I could justify raising in this spot with any two cards.
However, the big blind is very shortstacked, and raising commits me to call an all-in reshove from him, which he should feel committed enough to make with a wide range. My hand is well within this range, making it a trivial button steal given the bubble situation. Setup: Seat 1 at the other table busted in tenth place, sending the rest of us to the final table. Three hands have been played at the final table, with Seat 7 moving all-in the first, Seat 2 successfully stealing the second, and Seat 6 moving all-in the third.
All hands were won preflop. Seats 1, 2, 4, and 8 from my previous table remain in the same seats at the final table. Seat 3 is the strong player who was in Seat 8 at the table before that one, and Seats 6, 7, and 9 are the weaker unknowns who were in Seats 7, 4, and 5 respectively at it. I am extremely lucky to have all three strong, highstakes players on my direct right at the final table!
Now that we have reached the final table, the pay jumps become a lot more meaningful. I do not expect the strong players to be worried in the least about moving up the ladder. Yet some of the weaker players may be noticeably concerned about moving up, especially once we are down to about four players and the jumps become much more substantial.
The payouts are as follows:. Preflop 12, : The action folds to Seat 1, who moves all-in from the cutoff for 28, The remaining players fold to me. There is 41, in the pot, and it would cost me an additional 23, to make the call, pot odds of 1. Given Seat 1s desperate short stack of less than six big blinds, pot odds of 1. I call, and my opponent shows K 5. The board runs out 8 5 4 J 4. I win the pot and eliminate Seat 1 in ninth place. Preflop 12, : The action folds to me in the small blind with a complete piece of cheese.
My opponent is the shortest stack with 9 big blinds left after posting. I could limp in, hoping to see a flop, but my opponent should use it as an opportunity to push all-in with any two cards, and I could not call. There is a small chance that he might fear that I am trapping by limping and check behind.
But even then, I would be counting on being able to push him off of his hand on the flop with a bet as I would have to lead out on any flop as that would likely be my only chance at winning the hand. Limping is way too weak and out of the question. Putting pressure on my opponent by raising is a much better play than limping. I would not want to make a standard raise as I would commit myself to call if he shoved all-in.
I am better off forcing him to a decision for all of his chips by shoving all-in. I believe that he is a weak player, and he probably would not risk his stack with too weak of a hand. Plugging this range for him and my hand into pokerstove, J-2o will win Folding my hand is my last and probably best option. My opponent may call with a wider range than the one I assigned, making my shove less profitable. His stack is of no danger to me at the moment, and keeping him around may even increase my fold equity against other short stacked opponents on subsequent steals since they would be more reluctant to bust with a shorter stack still at the table.
Giving him a walk should also lend more credibility to my future steals, especially against him in similar blind vs. Nonetheless, I choose in the heat of the moment to move all-in, and my opponent calls with K 4, a hand that I mistakenly figured into his folding range.
The board runs out Q T J Q 2, and I lucksack my way to an even bigger chip stack, eliminating my opponent in eighth place. This hand demonstrates how decisions can be vastly different based on the hand ranges that you assign to your opponent.
However, my opponent had a much wider calling range than expected. J-2o wins this battle With an increased calling range, a marginal shove can easily become a fold. Understand also, especially deep in tournaments, that chips gained do not have as much value as chips lost. For this reason, you generally only want to play in profitable situations, not marginal ones. Setup: This is two hands after the previous one. I folded Q-8o to a raise from Seat 4 in the hand between.
Preflop 11, : Seat 9 folds, Seat 2 raises to 12,, and the rest of the table folds to me on the button. I could make a reasonable case for calling, threebetting, or even folding. Yet given that an aggressive player is raising, my chip stack, my position, and most importantly, final table dynamics, mean that I can easily dismiss folding as the worst option.
Calling would be reasonable, as it will be difficult for my opponent to fire many shells postflop out of position since he is currently third in chips and losing a decent-sized pot would drastically affect his chip position. Once my opponent shows weakness postflop, I should be able to take the pot away whether I hit or not. Although it is a reasonable option, there are several potential pitfalls to flat-calling here.
First, I open the door for one of the blinds to squeeze with an all-in reshove, which I do not want to face with K-Qo. They should be hesitant to make a play, given that the raise came from early position; on the other hand, they are probably aware by this point that Seat 2 opens with a very wide range and my flat-call should not appear very strong.
Even if I do get to take the flop heads up in position, I will be up against a strong opponent who may not let me get away with stealing the pot if he makes a good read. Threebetting here with the intention of folding to a fourbet is the strongest option, especially given the table dynamics.
My opponent is currently in third place with almost forty big blinds. I do not expect him to get out of line with a fourbet reraise or shove unless he happens to be extremely strong here. Given the circumstances, it is probably profitable for me to threebet here with any two cards, but having a hand as strong as K-Q is good back up just in case Seat 7 wakes up with a hand and shoves his short stack in, which I would be committed to call.
Note that I can almost completely discount Seat 2 calling a reasonably sized threebet here with his stack size, as he would not want to play an inflated pot out of position. If he does so, alarm bells should be ringing that he may be trapping with AA or KK! My relatively tight image also contributes to getting away with this resteal a much higher percentage of the time than someone he would perceive to be a maniac could manage. I raise to 35,, a little less than 3x his bet, and the blinds and Seat 2 all fold.
Setup: This is three hands after the previous one. I stole the blinds from the cutoff with A-Jo, and then I open folded Q-To from the hijack because I had been so active.
Seat 7 shoved all-in and won that hand uncontested. Preflop 11, : Seat 4 raises under-the-gun to 12, The action is on me in the next seat with the same hand with which I just threebet another strong opponent. However, the circumstances here are very different: I am facing a much deeper-stacked opponent who may play back at me without a strong hand or flat-call me, although it would be unlikely since a reraise from my position usually indicates a very strong hand.
I perceive Seat 4 to be much tighter than Seat 2, so I am in more danger of running into a big hand than in the previous hand. Most importantly, I have the entire table to get by if I threebet here, so there is a much higher chance of running into a hand than before. If I end up threebet folding or having to show this hand for any reason, it may destroy my tight image at this table, making it much more difficult for me to pick up chips without showdown later on. Although a threebet here would have a decent success rate because it would look so strong, I do not believe it is worth the risk, especially given that I just threebet a few hands before.
The action folds around to Seat 2 in the cutoff, who threebets to 37, The rest of the table and Seat 4 all fold. Seat 2 wins. Setup: Three hands have passed, and I have folded o, o, and s. The blinds and antes have increased, putting added pressure on the short stacks. Before the blinds increased, Seat 7 open raised from early position with a fifteen big blind stack and folded to Seat 9s reshove. This hand enforced my belief of Seat 7 as a weak player, as it is not optimal to open raise any hand with such a short stack unless you are willing to call off the rest of your chips.
Preflop 14, : Seat 9 opens under-the-gun for 15, The action folds to me on the button. I am once again in good position with a fairly strong hand and an opportunity to threebet resteal. However, several factors make this a far different situation than the one in which I recently threebet Seat 2.
Seat 9 is open raising in early position, and its his second straight raise I folded s to his previous raise, and he won the blinds uncontested , two strong indicators that he has a legitimately strong hand.
Also, because he has just over twenty big blinds, he is not a prime resteal target since threebet folding here would be awkward, as I would be getting close to the proper odds to call a fourbet shove.
I certainly do not want to commit , chips with K-J! I fold, and Seat 7 shoves his short stack all-in. Seat 9 calls with , and Seat 7 shows A 8. Seat 9s hand holds up, and Seat 7 is eliminated in seventh place. Setup: This is 17 hands after the hand previously described.
In between, I folded the following hands with a few exceptions: K-7o, J-6o, o, A-Qs raised, won the pot uncontested , Q-5o, Q-4o, s, Q-4o, A-6s raised, won the pot uncontested , o, o, o, o, T5s, T-3o, and o.
This is the first hand since the increase of the blinds and antes. Seats 3 and 8 are now extremely short stacked. Seat 2 just threebet and folded to Seat 9s fourbet shove in the previous hand, and is thus left with only 16 big blinds. Preflop 18, : The action folds to Seat 2 who raises to 19, The rest of the table folds to me in the big blind. I am in a tough spot with a somewhat strong hand facing a raise from a strong player with an awkward 16 big blind stack.
I do not believe that Seat 2 would open raise here and fold to a shove, as I know that I would not do so with his stack. With 16 big blinds, I believe he has a little time to wait for a hand worth committing himself with, and thus he would choose to fold mediocre hands like K-J, A-9, or low pocket pairs.
However, I am unsure of this latter point, and of course of his precise range it may include such hands as the smallest pairs and slightly weaker A-x hands , and there is an ever-so-slight chance that he is willing to raise and fold here, thus widely increasing his range. Because I expect Seat 2 to be strong here, and thus do not see him folding to a reraise, I do not want to reshove with K-Qo.
Nonetheless, facing a small raise, and partly invested in the big blind, I am tempted to call and see a cheap flop. Open Preview See a Problem? Details if other :. Thanks for telling us about the problem.
Return to Book Page. Jon 'Pearljammer' Turner ,. Jon 'Apestyles' Van Fleet ,. Matthew Hilger. Volume 1 of this series shed new light on the fundamentals of early tournament play. Volume 2 showed you how to get from the money down to the final table. Through their analysis, you'll learn all the different factors that a professional poker pro might consider while playing a hand.
The authors are not only consistent winners, but powerful teachers as well. Step by step, they reveal their decision-making processes, and you learn from their different perspectives and playing style. Get A Copy.
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